This paper applies previous theoretical and empirical results on inflation and demand for money to a study of inflationary finance and the welfare cost of inflation. The amount of revenue generated by a steady inflation is derived as a function of the inflation rate and some underlying parameters. Empirically, the revenue-maximizing rate is on the order of 140 percent per month with the corresponding revenue approximating 15 percent of national income. It is argued that hyperinflations become unstable when the revenue-maximizing rate is exceeded. Because inflation leads to higher transaction costs (resulting from greater payment frequencies and reduced use of "money" as a payments medium), there is a net social cost attached to inflationary finance. The model implies that marginal collection costs of inflationary finance exceed 50 percent for all positive rates of inflation-hence, alternative means of raising revenue should be socially preferable. The analysis also provides estimates of the social gain from moving to the optimum quantity of money as 1-3 percent of income.
endogenous payment interval, Tln, where n is the number of payments that occur over a time interval T. It is assumed that the real cost of making (wage) payments is solely a lump-sum amount a/P. Prices change at the constant (proportionate) rate rp. The real rate at which increases in the payments period are discounted is r*. In the case of deferred wage payment, a lengthening of the pay period implies an increase in the average loan outstanding from employees to employers (Barro 1970b , p. 1235). The appropriate discount rate for the payments period is therefore the difference between the rates imputed by employees and employers, r*-rh -rf, where rh is the employee (household) rate and rf is the employer (firm) rate. In the earlier analysis rf was assumed to be (approximately) zero; hence r* was equal to rh.
If all payments corresponding to the income stream Y/P are monetized, the cost per time (to employers and employees) associated with the period Tln can be approximated by' 1 Equation (1) assumes that employers receive income and employees spend income at a uniform rate, and that no satisfactory intermediate assets are available-that is, both units hold money until either a wage payment or a purchase of commodities a n Y T a n Z : (r. + r*) (MIP) + --: (rp + r*) --+--
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The first term in the cost expression corresponds to the interest cost on average (employer plus employee) money balances: (M/P) (Y/P) (T/n). The second term describes the cost of making payments at the rate n/T. The cost-minimizing payments period is T/n aiJ (2) iYI/P(rp + r*) As inflation intensifies, the optimal pay period declines in equation (2), thus signifying a direct increase in velocity and a corresponding reduction in real money holding.
Denoting the endogenously determined fraction of transactions which employ money by (1 -(), the average holding of money is given by (using eq. is assumed to be constant (since a/P is regarded as primarily an income-foregone cost). In equation (3 ), if the monetization fraction, (1 -SF), is fixed the elasticity of money demand with respect to the inflation rate approaches -1/2 as rp becomes large relative to r*. For moderate rates of (positive) inflation, the (absolute) elasticity is below one-half.
From the previous analysis, the determination of (D involves a weighing of the inflationary cost attached to the continued use of money against some loss of convenience (increased transaction costs) associated with a switch to an alternative, relatively stable-valued transactions medium (such as barter). Under a particular assumption concerning the distribution over types of transactions of the benefit of money usage (a gamma distribution), the fraction of monetized expenditures can be written as an explicit function of the inflation rate:2 occurs. The formula also involves a minor approximation of the form (r. + r*) T/n < 1. 2 The earlier paper contains some errors in the derivation of P (Barro 1970b For moderate values of rp (rp r*), the term involving k is empirically negligible and qrp can be approximated by the first term on the right side of equation (5). For very high values of rp, the second term, which derives from the substitution of an alternative transactions medium, becomes important. Since k > 0, the inflation-rate elasticity eventually rises (absolutely) above one-half. The rate of increase in the absolute elasticity is positively related to k and, therefore, inversely related to the average cost of employing the alternative payments medium. The model described above was extended to situations where the inflation rate varied over time through the development of an effective rate-ofinflation (nEc) mechanism. Essentially, a distributed-lag mechanism involving a variable coefficient of adjustment was derived. The discrete form of the distributed-lag model is (when r* < se) where jEt is the actual (average) rate of inflation between t -1 and t, a bar indicates an average of t and t -1 values, and b is an unknown coefficient, with (adt/ab) > 0, (O0t/1te) > 0, and 0 < t 1.
Given a value for b and a time series for n (and a starting point for a'), equation (6) determines a time series for Jne. The ne variable is then incorporated into the money-demand model of equations (3) 
where the theory suggests: a2 _12, k> 0.
Making the approximations: Se > > r* 0 and a1 log (A * Y/P) constant, the four parameters (al, a2, k, b) of equations (6) In the empirical estimation the real rate of discount, r*, was assumed sponds to the difference between two real rates of return, rh-rf, rather than to the absolute return, which would generally be identified with rf 5 If the government issues only some portion of the total money supply, the finance is shared with other issuers of money. However, a full analysis would also have to consider the state of competition in the banking industry. (table 1) .8
At a 6 percent annual rate of price change (1,X2 percent per month) government revenue is about 1 percent of total income. This magnitude should be illustrative for cases of moderate inflation, though some modification is needed to account for the effect of real growth (see n. 9, below). At an inflation rate of 5 percent per month (which characterizes the most extreme Latin American experiences), inflationary finance is between 4 and 6 percent of income. Inflationary finance reaches a peak of 13-19 percent of income at an inflation rate in the vicinity of 150 percent per month. This peak behavior has particular significance for the stability of hyperinflation and is discussed in detail below.
Since government revenue is determined by the inflation rate from equations (8) and (9), one may consider the monetary growth rate (-ri,) which maximizes the steady-state volume of inflationary finance. Since revenue is given by: G r -(MIP) (rn), the "optimal" expansion rate is the one which corresponds to a money-demand elasticity of -1 (see Cagan 1956 , pp. 77-86).9 In the current model the inflation-rate elasticity of money demand is determined from equation ( 
~~~~10)
Therefore, a small value of k (high average cost for employing substitute transactions media) corresponds to a high revenue-maximizing rate of monetary expansion. The amount of revenue relative to total real income at the rate It* can be explicitly calculated from equation (9) The estimates of maximum revenue range from-5-7 percent of national income for Poland to 15-22 percent for Hungary I. Corresponding to the overall estimate of k, the overall estimate of A* is about 140 percent per month, which corresponds to 12-17 percent of national income." Table 1 also contains values of ?tlmax, the actual maximum of monthly average monetary growth rate which occurred during each hyperinflation, and jtmaxC, the extreme value of the effective rate of inflation which occurred. Since steady-state measures are involved, it may be useful to compare the estimated value of A* with jTmaxe, as well as with [Imax, in order to determine whether the optimum expansion rate was exceeded (for a significant time period) in each case. One may conclude from table 1 that the revenue-maximizing rate was exceeded for Germany and Hungary II but not for Austria, Hungary I, and Poland.
The Stability of Hyperinflation
The view of monetary expansion as a vehicle for generating government revenue may be used to analyze one aspect of the stability of hyperinflation. If an economy is initially in a noninflationary situation, government revenue may be generated by instituting a positive value of At. Additional expenditures may be financed by further increases in At, and each increase is successful (that is, actually results in a higher steady-state revenue) as long as [i < At*. However, if a total steady-state revenue in excess of G* g* * X is desired, inflationary finance cannot suffice. When [t is pressed beyond At*, revenue declines (at least, eventually) rather than rises. If the government is oblivious to the basic problem, the reaction to this reduced revenue may be an additional increase in At, which produces further reductions in revenue and creates added pressure for even higher rates of expansion. Eventually, a nearly complete flight from money would result, and the "benefit" of inflationary finance would vanish. At this point (or possibly sooner if the government is astute), considerable pressure can be expected for basic monetary reform (which often involves renaming the currency unit but, in its essence, involves curtailing the growth rate of the money stock).
From an empirical standpoint, the five cases of hyperinflation tend to substantiate this sort of process. The most interesting evidence derives estimates of the a-coefficient in Cagan's form (see above) which are ten to twenty times as large as those estimated by Cagan, thus reducing the estimated revenuemaximizing inflation rate by a factor of ten to twenty. Third, he includes a nonzero value for real growth (p in n. 9, above) which also tends to lower the estimated rate. 
III. The Welfare Cost of Inflation
This section considers the net welfare cost, or excess burden, imposed on an economy by a steady, anticipated rate of inflation. 12 The revenue obtained by government, [t(MIP), is directly balanced by an inflationary cost to individuals, r"(M/P).13 The net welfare cost of inflation (abstracting from any direct costs of printing money) derives from the transaction costs which individuals incur in order to avoid the private interest costs associated with holding money. In the current model increases in inflation induce increases in transaction costs in two respects: first, individuals raise the frequency of transactions (increase velocity) for monetized transactions, and, second, individuals employ alternative payments media with higher transaction costs for a greater proportion of their transactions. At moderate rates of inflation, the substitution of alternative payments media for money is empirically unimportant. It is shown in table 2 that F, the fraction of transactions conducted via a substitute media, remains below 1 percent until r, reaches a value between 2 and 5 percent per month that is, until the rate of inflation becomes substantially larger than r*. Hence, for inflation rates with magnitudes equal to or below the order of r*, changes in transaction costs produced by changes in rp reflect mostly alterations in the frequency of monetized transactions. In this range of rp the total transaction costs can be approximated by (alP) (n/T), which is the cost of conducting monetized transactions at frequency n1T in equation (1). Moreover, when the payments period is selected according to the optimal policy indicated in equation (2), individuals act so as to equate the (total) amount of transaction costs to the (total) amount of interest costs.14 That is,
W (alP)(n1T) -(rp + r*)(M/P)
A(Y/P) \rpr* (when rp . r*),
is not offset by the flow of government revenue. However, an increase in M/P can be viewed as an increase in private real wealth which is evaluated in flow terms by individuals as r*(M/P). Hence, the increase in real wealth offsets the real interest-foregone cost, r*(M/P), in eq. (1). However, to the extent that a change in M/P reflects a change in the average holding of goods inventories, the change in real interest foregone on these goods holdings would be an element of both private and social cost. where W is the welfare cost, which corresponds to the resources used up in undertaking monetized transactions at frequency n/T.
The minimum welfare cost in equation (12) is zero, which is attained at rp r*. That is, the welfare cost disappears when money bears real interest at rate r*. At this point, the private cost which individuals attach to holding money, which depends on the rate rp + r*, is zero-hence, individuals are not motivated to engage in costly transactions in order to economize on private interest costs. Since, in fact, there is no social cost attached to holding money (that is, the interest cost is a private, but not a social, cost), while there is a social cost attached to making transactions, the condition rp= -r* leads to the social optimum where welfare cost disappears.15 This conclusion corresponds to the usual result in the literature on the optimum quantity of money-see, for example, Friedman (1969, pp. 33-34).
Since (F 0 when rp , r*, government revenue is determined from equation (3) The MCC is zero at r= -r* rises to one-half at rp 0, and rises above one-half as rp becomes positive. The important result is that the marginal collection cost of inflationary finance exceeds one-half for all positive rates of inflation.
For very high rates of inflation (rp > 2-5 percent per month), the substitution of alternative payments media becomes important, and equation (13), which omits this substitution possibility, will significantly understate the marginal collection cost of inflationary finance. The welfare cost must now include the transaction costs associated with the use of (socially) less efficient payments media, along with the cost of conducting monetized transactions, which has already been considered.'6 Both com- 
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The integration can be carried out, using the money-demand function of equations (3) and (4), to yield a closed-form expression for W. The resulting expression is cumbersome and is not written out here. Since the integration under the money-demand curve in equation (14) implicitly includes the added transaction costs for movement into substitute payments media, the calculated value of W exceeds that indicated in equation (12). However, the departure from that equation is significant only when rp is substantially larger than r*. The expression for welfare cost derived from equation ( For rates of inflation between 2 and 5 percent per month, which are typical rates for some Latin American countries, the estimated welfare cost is between 3 and 7 percent of income. When the rate of inflation rises above 5 percent per month, the welfare cost advances rapidly. For the 25-50 percent per month range of inflation rates, which typifies hyperinflations, the estimated welfare cost is between 11 and 22 percent of income. Finally, when the inflation rate rises as high as 100-150 percent per month, which is the range in which hyperinflations have tended to become unstable (see Section II, above), the estimated welfare cost is between 22 and 38 percent of income.
The marginal effect of inflation on welfare cost can be determined from differentiation of the integral in equation (14) Bailey (1956, p. 108) suggests that 7 percent is a reasonable approximation for tax collection costs (including misallocation costs) in countries with poor administrative systems. However, since Bailey is apparently referring to average, rather than to marginal, collection costs, the appropriate figure may be substantially higher, such as 15-20 percent. Nevertheless, if the 50 percent MCC figure for inflationary finance is accepted as reasonably accurate, one cannot make a plausible case for inflationary finance on social welfare grounds. Superficially, raising revenue by printing money has appeal, particularly to underdeveloped countries, because of the low direct administrative cost. However, the indirect cost is sufficiently great that a poorly administered income or sales tax should be preferable from the standpoint of social welfare. Table 3 contains empirical estimates of the parameters, (ca,, k, b), from the model of equations (6) and (7) and therefore produce shifts in vt* and g*-this possibility is not borne out by the empirical evidence on the Hungarian experiences.
IV. Additional Emnpirical Results

Test for Absence of Money Illusion
Since the underlying theory is a theory of real demand for money, all empirical estimation has been carried out, thus far, with log (MIP) as the dependent variable. The theoretical absence of money illusion in the demand function can be tested by using -log (P) as the dependent variable (since P is regarded as endogenous, with M exogenous) and including -log M as an independent variable with an unrestricted coefficient: NOTE.-2 log X = T log (SSE*/SSE), where X is the likelihood ratio. SSE is the minimum sum of squared errors with a3 unrestricted. SSE* is the minimum subject to d^ -1, and T is the number of observations. Asymptotically, -2 log X is distributed as x2 (1) in this case.
Poland. The null hypothesis is rejected for both Hungarian cases. This rejection in the Hungarian cases is, in a sense, consistent with the large average errors that characterize the regression fits for these cases (table 3) .23 It is not possible to account for these problems at this point, though one possible source of difficulty is the assumed exogeneity of M in equation (16). In any case, the satisfactory results on absence of money illusion for Austria, Germany, and Poland provide support for the underlying model. 23 The first Hungarian case also exhibits strong serial correlation of residuals (table  3) , while the Polish and German cases exhibit smaller amounts of significant residual autocorrelation. The inclusion of some additional explanatory variables in the regression equations-a real-income proxy, a time-trend variable, and seasonal factors-did not remove the serial correlation in these cases (Barro 1970a , pp. 58-61). The four post-World War I cases have also been reestimated under the assumption that the error term was generated by a first-order Markov process: ut = kut_1 + vt (Barro 1970a, pp. 62-66) . Simultaneous estimation of k with the (ac, a2, k, b) parameters showed that the previous estimates for Austria and Germany were insensitive to this shift in the assumed error process. The results for Poland were mixed, since the parameter estimates were not substantially altered by the inclusion of the k-coefficient, but the first-order Markov process did not fully account for the residual autocorrelation in this case. The results for the first Hungarian case were entirely unsatisfactory, since the estimate of k did not converge below 1.0. This difficulty is consistent with the other problems that have been encountered in this case and suggests some type of specification error-that is, some error in the theoretical form or (more likely, considering the success in the other post-World War I cases) some data problems leading to serious errors in the measurement of variables. 
